CPLR 3212: Unconditional Summary Judgment May Not Be Granted Against Unpleaded Cause of Action Asserted in Plaintiff\u27s Submissions in Response to Motion by Regan, Frances Ferrito
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 54 
Number 1 Volume 54, Fall 1979, Number 1 Article 10 
July 2012 
CPLR 3212: Unconditional Summary Judgment May Not Be 
Granted Against Unpleaded Cause of Action Asserted in Plaintiff's 
Submissions in Response to Motion 
Frances Ferrito Regan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Regan, Frances Ferrito (1979) "CPLR 3212: Unconditional Summary Judgment May Not Be Granted 
Against Unpleaded Cause of Action Asserted in Plaintiff's Submissions in Response to Motion," St. John's 
Law Review: Vol. 54 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol54/iss1/10 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
1979] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
generous construction normally accorded motions for disclosure,'2
this inclusive definition makes it highly unlikely that an examining
attorney's motion will be denied. Thus, the protection afforded a
nonparty witness under the Kurzman rule appears minimal.28 The
intention of the CPLR draftsman would seem to be better served by
shifting the burden of coming forward to the adverse party or poten-
tial witness. By adjudicating a motion for a protective order, the
court can effectively and efficiently determine the adequacy of the
special circumstances.12 9 In this light, the Kurzman court's interpre-
tation dictating a pre-subpoena motion appears too rigid.
Michael G. Glass
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3212: Unconditional summary judgment may not be granted
against unpleaded cause of action asserted in plaintiff's submissions
in response to motion
Under CPLR 3212, summary judgment must be denied upon a
showing sufficient to require a trial on any factual issue."' Whether
I" See note 107 supra; SEGEL § 344, at 421; 3A WK&M 3101.04, .07, .08.
123 Since a motion for a subpoena usually will be granted, see note 107 supra, it appears
that dispensing with the motion will be the most economic mechanism for articulating com-
plaints and correcting abuses. The Kurzman court's reading of CPLR 3101(a) (4) to require a
court order in every instance, however, seems wastefully nonselective in its breadth. See
CPLR 3101, commentary at 28 (1970). The protective order, on the other hand, appears to
be a better mechanism for judicial review because, by its nature, it would be invoked discrimi-
nately.
I" See note 128 supra.
110 CPLR 3212(b) (Supp. 1979) provides:
A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the
pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions.
The affidavit. . . shall show that there is no defense to the cause of action or that
the cause of action or defense has no merit. The motion shall be granted if, upon
all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be estab-
lished sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in
favor of any party.
To move successfully under CPLR 3212(b) a party must show all the necessary evidentiary
facts and prove that, as a matter of law, no defense is available to preclude relief in his favor.
In order to defeat the summary judgment motion, the opposing party must show facts "having
probative value sufficient to demonstrate an unresolved material issue." 4 WK&M 3212.12;
see, e.g., Piedmont Hotel Co. v. A.E. Nettleton Co., 263 N.Y. 25, 188 N.E. 145 (1933);
Cattonar v. Edward Ermold Co., 279 App. Div. 564, 107 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1st Dep't 1951).
Where damages is the only triable issue, or the basis of the motion is one of the grounds
set forth in CPLR 3211(a) or (b), the court may order an immediate trial on those issues.
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a denial of summary judgment is warranted where facts are submit-
ted to support an unpleaded cause of action, however, has generated
conflicting lower court decisions. 131 Recently, in Alvord & Swift v.
Stewart M. Muller Construction Co.," 2 the Court of Appeals, in
dictum, declared that where a plaintiff's submissions in response to
a defendant's motion provide evidentiary facts showing a cause of
action not stated in the pleadings, unconditional summary judg-
ment should not be granted. 133
CPLR 3212(c) (1979). Where the complaint does not state a cause of action, id. 3211(a)(7)
(1979), or a defense of merit, id. (b), a party may move for dismissal prior to joinder of issue.
If a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) or (b) is supported by extrinsic evidence, it
may be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Id. 3211(c) (1979).
131 Despite the assertion of an unpleaded cause of action, some courts have granted an
unconditional summary judgment, e.g., Central State Bank v. American Appraisal Co., 33
App. Div. 2d 1009, 307 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1st Dep't 1970), aff'd mem, 28 N.Y.2d 578, 268 N.E.2d
329, 319 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1971); Connors v. Hoare, 18 App. Div. 2d 992, 238 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1st
Dep't 1963), while many others have granted summary judgment with leave to replead, e.g.,
Raymond Babtkis Assocs. v. Tarazi Realty Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 754, 310 N.Y.S.2d 343 (lst
Dep't 1970); Wolfson v. Mandell, 13 App. Div. 2d 760, 215 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1st Dep't 1961),
affl'd, 11 N.Y.2d 704, 181 N.E.2d 217, 225 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1962); Fobare v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank,
77 Misc. 2d 210, 352 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1974); Mandracchia v.
McKee, 8 Misc. 2d 965, 171 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957). Conversely, some
unpleaded claims have withstood a defendant's summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Bailey
v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 47 App. Div. 2d 363, 367 N.Y.S.2d 107 (3d Dep't 1975); Crane v.
Perfect Film & Chem. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 288, 329 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1st Dep't 1972); Wolf v.
Wolf, 47 Misc. 2d 756, 263 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965), modified, 26 App. Div.
2d 529, 271 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam). Still other courts have granted a
plaintiff summary judgment on a unpleaded cause of action. E.g., Dampskibsselskabet Torm
A/S v. P.L. Thomas Paper Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 347, 274 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1st Dep't 1966);
Annutto v. Town of Herkimer, 56 Misc. 2d 186, 288 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County
1968), appeal dismissed mem., 24 N.Y.2d 820, 248 N.E.2d 499, 300 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1969).
Contra, Lefft v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 40 App. Div. 2d 641, 336 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1st Dep't
1972) (per curiam); Peripheral Equip. Inc. v. Farrington Mfg. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 11, 285
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1st Dep't 1967).
This conflict apparently was generated by the Court of Appeals' refusal to permit an
unpleaded cause of action to defeat summary judgment in Cohen v. City Co., 283 N.Y. 112,
27 N.E.2d 803 (1949). In Cohen, the plaintiff sued in quasi-contract for money had and
received. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of
limitations had expired. Id. at 114, 27 N.E.2d at 804. In opposing the motion, the plaintiff
for the first time indicated that his cause of action lied in fraud. Id. at 116, 27 N.E.2d at 805.
The fraud action would have been timely commenced since the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the plaintiff's discovery of the fraud. CPA § 48(5) (current version at
CPLR 213(8) (1979)). The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the grant of summary judg-
ment, stating that if a plaintiff were allowed to recover on a cause of action not pleaded, there
would be no need for pleadings at all. 283 N.Y. at 117, 27 N.E.2d at 805.
Commentators criticized Cohen as defeating the purpose of summary judgment. It was
argued that because the affidavits showed a possible triable issue, the defective pleading did
not justify a grant of summary judgment. See, e.g., B. SHIENTAG, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 67-73
(1941).
13 46 N.Y.2d 276, 385 N.E.2d 1238, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1978).
'3 Id. at 280, 385 N.E.2d at 1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
1979] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
In Alvord & Swift, the plaintiff subcontracted with the defen-
dant general contractor, Stewart M. Muller Construction Company,
to perform work on the renovation of a facility owned by the code-
fendant, New York Telephone Company.' u The subcontract pro-
vided that the sole recourse available to the plaintiff for breach of
contract was against the general contractor.15 When Alvord & Swift
incurred substantial losses on the subcontract because construction
was completed 3 years behind schedule, the general contractor's
insolvency prompted the plaintiff to name New York Telephone
Company in its action to recover the expenses caused by the delay.' 36
Deeming the action as one for breach of contract, the Supreme
Court, New York County, granted New York Telephone's motion
for summary judgment based on its lack of contractual privity
with the plaintiff.'3 The Appellate Division, First Department,
affirmed.'38
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the appellate divi-
sion correctly found that no factual issues existed.'39 Chief Judge
Breitel, writing for the majority,' recognized, however, that the
plaintiff made out in its submissions an additional cause of action
for tortious interference with contract."' Thus, if the plaintiff's sub-
'3 Id. at 279-80, 385 N.E.2d at 1239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
'3 Id. at 280, 385 N.E.2d at 1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 311. Muller Construction Company's
prime contract with New York Telephone Company contained a provision stating that
"'[n]othing contained in the Contract Documents shall create any contractual relations
between the Owners. . . and any Subcontractor.' "Id., 385 N.E.2d at 1239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
310-11. This provision was incorporated by reference into Alvord & Swift's subcontract. Id.
,3, Id. at 280, 385 N.E.2d at 1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
137 Id.
'" 56 App. Div. 761, 391 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1st Dep't 1977) (mem.), affl'd, 46 N.Y.2d 276,
385 N.E.2d 1238, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1978).
,3, 46 N.Y.2d at 279, 385 N.E.2d at 1239, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
", Judges Jasen, Jones, and Wachtler joined Chief Judge Breitel in the majority. Judge
Cooke voted to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge Gabrielli concurred, and Judge
Fuchsberg concurred in part and dissented in part.
"' 46 N.Y.2d at 280, 385 N.E.2d at 1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 311. As its sixth cause of action,
the plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the owner" 'actively interfered with and disrupted
job progress and caused delays and damage to Alvord.' "Id. at 286, 385 N.E.2d at 1243, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 315 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added
by Judge Fuchsberg). On this basis, Alvord & Swift argued in its submissions that its action
included a claim for tortious interference with contract. Id. Tortious intentional interference
with contractual relations arises when "[olne . . . intentionally and improperly interferes
with the performance of a contract. . . between another and a third person by inducing or
otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
Tors § 766 (1977).
The plaintiff in Alvord & Swift failed to show in its affidavits that New York Telephone
had acted intentionally to interfere with the contract, a material element of the alleged tort.
46 N.Y.2d at 282, 385 N.E.2d at 1241, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 312. Additionally, the Court observed
that although an owner may have a legal duty to refrain from interfering with the work of
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missions had raised a question of fact concerning the unpleaded
claim, the Court declared that the failure to plead the tort claim
would have constituted an insufficient basis upon which to award
unconditional summary judgment.4 2 The majority observed that
deficient pleadings did not constrain pre-CPLR courts from discov-
ering "the nature of the case,"'1 3 and reasoned that the liberal poli-
cies underlying the CPLR militated against further restrictive ap-
plication of "archaic" pleading rules.' Since the gravamen of a
motion for summary judgment is not the sufficiency of the plead-
ings, it was concluded that a court may inquire into whether an
unpleaded cause of action is made out.'
Judge Cooke, concurring in the result, refused to recognize any
unpleaded cause of action."' Observing that the notice requirement
in the pleadings continues under the liberalized pleading rules of the
CPLR,117 Judge Cooke maintained that a distinction exists between
a defective pleading and a cause of action not pleaded. The concurr-
ence concluded, therefore, that when a defendant does not receive
the requisite notice, an unpleaded cause of action should not defeat
summary judgment.'
It is suggested that while a defendant is entitled to notice in the
pleadings of all causes of action alleged,'49 a failure to plead the
subcontractors, the duty can only be contractually imposed upon the owner. Id.; accord,
Cauldwell-Wingate Co. v. State, 276 N.Y. 365, 12 N.E.2d 443 (1938); Peckham Road Co. v.
State, 32 App. Div. 2d 139, 300 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dep't 1969), aff'd mem., 28 N.Y.2d 733,
269 N.E.2d 825, 321 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1971). In the absence of such a contractual relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant in Alvord & Swift, the plaintiff was precluded from
invoking a theory of legal duty to refrain from interference. 46 N.Y.2d at 282, 385 N.E.2d at
1241, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
" 46 N.Y.2d at 280, 385 N.E.2d at 1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
1,3 Id. at 281, 385 N.E.2d at 1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
"I Id. The Court noted that where a defendant has been granted summary judgment
based on a deficiency in the plaintiff's pleading, the courts have freely permitted the plaintiff
to replead. Id.; see note 157 infra.
145 46 N.Y.2d at 281, 385 N.E.2d at 1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
Id. at 282-85, 385 N.E.2d at 1241-43, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 312-14 (Cooke, J., concurring).
' Id. at 283-84, 385 N.E.2d at 1242, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 313 (Cooke, J., concurring).
"5 Id. at 285, 385 N.E.2d at 1243, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 314 (Cooke, J., concurring).
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Fuchsberg declared that granting summary judgment
prior to discovery constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 287, 385 N.E.2d at 1244, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 316 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and contended
that the plaintiff's pleading sufficiently indicated a cause of action for tortious interference
to warrant such discovery, id. at 286, 385 N.E.2d at 1243-44, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 315 (Fuchsberg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I CPLR 3013 (1979). Designed to abolish the strict requirements of "code pleading,"
see 3 WK&M 3013.01, at 30-212, CPLR 3013 requires that the pleadings give notice of all
transactions and occurrences that will be proved and contain all "the material elements of
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proper cause of action should not alone be fatal to the plaintiff on a
motion for summary judgment.5 ' Initially, a defendant generally
would be far less prejudiced by a lack of notice than would a plain-
tiff by non-recognition of an unpleaded claim. Denying summary
judgment merely submits the issue to the trier of fact.' Granting
summary judgment, on the other hand, invokes the doctrine of res
judicata, thus precluding the plaintiff from repleading the poorly
articulated or omitted cause of action and permanently depriving
him of a favorable judgment. 1. 2 In such cases, the courts should use
each cause of action or defense" asserted, CPLR 3013 (1979); see CPLR 3013, commentary
at 611-12 (1974). Although the courts must liberally construe the pleadings and concern
themselves with substance over form, Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 64, 248
N.Y.S.2d 121, 126 (1st Dep't 1964), the requirement of notice is viewed as essential, see, e.g.,
Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 344, 346-47, 368 N.Y.S.2d 426, 430 (2d Dep't 1974);
Shapolsky v. Shapolsky, 22 App. Div. 2d 91, 92-93, 253 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (1st Dep't 1964).
"I In a situation converse to the one inAlvord & Swift, where a viable unpleaded defense
to the action has been proffered in response to the plaintiff's motion, summary judgment has
been denied, see Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N.Y. 267, 272, 146 N.E. 175, 376 (1925). In Curry,
Judge Cardozo reasoned that a motion for summary judgment is not an attack on the plead-
ings but a challenge that the claim or defense is groundless as a matter of law. The Curry
Court maintained, therefore, that a technical failure to state a defense in the answer should
not allow summary judgment to be granted where affidavits indicate the existence of a viable
defense. Id. at 272, 146 N.E. at 376. Most lower courts continue to follow Curry and refuse to
grant a plaintiff summary judgment where there exists an unpleaded defense available to the
defendant. See, e.g., Gem Drywall Corp. v. Scialdo & Sons, 34 App. Div. 2d 1063, 312
N.Y.S.2d 737 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 739, 263 N.E.2d 388, 314 N.Y.S.2d 990
(1970); Furlo v. Cheek, 20 App. Div. 2d 939, 248 N.Y.S.2d 947 (3d Dep't 1964); Cardinal
Lumber Co. v. Lincoln Park Builders Supply, Inc., 8 App. Div. 2d 839, 190 N.Y.S.2d 207 (2d
Dep't 1959).
151 CPLR 3212(b) (1979). See Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka, 287 N.Y. 91, 93, 38 N.E.2d
382, 382 (1941) (per curiam).
112 Ugarriza v. Schmieder, 46 N.Y.2d 471, 474, 386 N.E.2d 1324, 1325, 414 N.Y.S.2d 304,
305 (1979); Eidelberg v. Zellermayer, 5 App. Div. 2d 658, 662-63, 174 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (1st
Dep't 1958), affl'd, 6 N.Y.2d 815, 159 N.E.2d 691, 188 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1959). See generally
SIEGEL § 287. Judge Fuchsberg suggested in his dissent that the Court's "abuse of discretion"
in granting summary judgment prevented the plaintiff from discovering the necessary facts
to sustain his cause of action and, therefore, through the effects of res judicata, denied the
plaintiff any relief. 46 N.Y.2d at 287, 385 N.E.2d at 1244, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 315-16 (Fuchsberg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata
prevents relitigation of any issue that "might have been ...litigated," Schuylkull Fuel
Corp. v. Nieberg, 250 N.Y. 304, 306, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929), when the second cause of action
is based on the same facts and a different judgment would "destroy or impair rights or
interests established by the first [cause of action]," id. at 307, 165 N.E.2d at 457. Conse-
quently, in the case of summary judgment, if a plaintiff fails to plead the proper theory he
cannot subsequently seek relief on another theory. Eidelberg v. Zellermayer, 5 App. Div. 2d
658, 663, 174 N.Y.S.2d 300, 304 (1st Dept 1958), affl'd, 6 N.Y.2d 815, 159 N.E.2d 691, 188
N.Y.S.2d 204 (1959).
It should be noted that many courts, although granting summary judgment notwith-
standing the assertion of an unpleaded claim, have restricted the force of the orders to the
pleaded causes of action and have permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint and assert
19791
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CPLR 3212(e) (1) to grant partial summary judgment on the claims
in which factual issues are absent,' and should direct the plaintiff
to amend the complaint.'
It is submitted that the direction taken in Alvord & Swift,
albeit in dictum, should serve to prevent additional conflicting
lower court dispositions of unpleaded claims in the summary judg-
ment setting.' 5 Of greater import is the Court's promulgation of a
rule consistent with both the purposes of CPLR 3212 and the liberal
construction principles that govern interpretation of the CPLR.'5 '
Since the tenor of a summary judgment motion under CPLR 3212
requires the court to go beyond the pleadings and to consider the
submissions of the parties,"' it appears reasonable as a general rule
not to restrict a plaintiff to his pleadings when opposing a defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, despite the inartistic framing
of the complaint."
Frances Ferrito Regan
the formerly unpleaded claim. See note 131 supra. Furthermore, the Alvord & Swift Court
noted that such relief could be granted a plaintiff provided the new cause of action would
have been timely at the time the action was commenced. 46 N.Y.2d at 280, 385 N.E.2d at
1240, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 311; see CPLR 203(e) (1979). Indeed, the majority's position on this
issue implies a judicial cognizance of these discretionary steps taken by the lower courts. It
would appear, therefore, that permitting a meritorious unpleaded cause of action to defeat a
defendant's summary judgment motion would be a more direct method to achieve the same
result of allowing the plaintiff to go to trial.
", See CPLR 3212(e)(1)(1979). CPLR 3212(e)(1), in pertinent part, provides that
"summary judgment may be granted as to one or more causes of action, or part thereof ...
The court may also direct: (1) that the cause of action as to which summary judgment is
granted shall be severed from any remaining cause of action .... " See CPLR 3212, com-
mentary at 447-48 (1970).
I" See note 152 supra. CPLR 3025(b) (1979) provides: "[a] party may amend his plead-
ing. . . at any time by leave of court. . . . Leave shall be freely given upon such terms as
may be just . . . ." See CPLR 3025, commentary at 476-78 (1974).
155 See note 131 supra.
10 CPLR 104 (1979) provides that the CPLR "shall be liberally construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding." See Governor's
Memorandum of Approval of chs. 308-318, N.Y. Laws (April 4, 1962), reprinted in [19621
N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 331, 332; Hesson, The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, 27 ALB. L.
REv. 175 (1963). See also Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 CoLUm.
L. REv. 50 (1960).
15 CPLR 3212(b) (1979). On motion for summary judgment, the movant attempts to
establish that no issues of fact exist through the submission of all "available proof' including,
but not limited to, affidavits, written admissions and depositions. Id.
159 CPLR 3026 (1979) provides that "[p]leadings shall be liberally construed. Defects
shall be ignored if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced." Presaging a willingness
to depart from Cohen, see note 131 supra, the Court of Appeals, in Dulberg v. Mock, 1 N.Y.2d
54, 133 N.E.2d 695, 150 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1956), denied the defendant's motion to dismiss where,
although the pleadings were "inartistically drawn," the facts established a cause of action.
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ARTICLE 45 - EVIDENCE
CPLR 4503(a): Notwithstanding claim of attorney-client privilege,
attorney may be compelled under exigent circumstances to reveal
client's address in collateral proceeding to enforce a judgment
The attorney-client privilege, as embodied in CPLR 4503(a),
prevents the disclosure of confidential communications made by a
client to his attorney in the course of the professional relationship,
unless the client has waived the privilege.' During the pendency
of a civil litigation, CPLR 3118 permits one party to compel another
party to disclose his address.16 Recently, the issue arose whether,
Id. at 56, 133 N.E.2d at 695-96, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 181-82. The pro se status of the plaintiff, id.
at 56, 133 N.E.2d at 695, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 181, may have influenced the Dulberg Court,
however.
There may be cases where a defendant will be severely prejudiced by denying summary
judgment and allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to replead. Cf. DeFabio v. Nadler Rental
Serv., Inc., 27 App. Div. 2d 931, 278 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep't 1967) (party waits an
"inexcusably long period of time"); Ciccone v. Glenwood Holding Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 273, 253
N.Y.S.2d 576 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 1964) (lapse of time bars plaintiff relief from another
party). See also CPLR 3025, commentary at 477-78 (1974).
"I' CPLR 4503(a) provides in pertinent part:
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any person
who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential commu-
nication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the course of
professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such commu-
nication, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose such communication, in any
action .. .or . . .proceeding ....
CPLR 4503(a) (Pam. 1979).
The attorney-client privilege against nonconsensual disclosure of confidential communi-
cations is considered necessary to promote full disclosure between an attorney and his client.
E. FisCH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 516, at 336-38 (2d ed. 1977); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVMENcE § 2290,
at 543 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Be-
tween Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL.. L. REv. 487 (1928); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464 (1977). The
privilege has been deemed to exist:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
J. WiGMORE, supra, § 2292, at 554 (emphasis and footnote omitted). An attorney-client rela-
tionship must exist before the privilege of confidentiality may attach. Id. §§ 2300-2304, at
580-87; E. FisCH, supra, § 519, at 341-42; see People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County
Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 718, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 368 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affl'd, 242 App. Div.
611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (1st Dep't 1934).
"I CPLR 3118 states in part:
A party may serve on any party a written notice demanding a verified statement
setting forth the post office address and residence of the party . . . and of any
person who possessed a cause of action or defense asserted in the action which has
been assigned.
CPLR 3118 (1970).
